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Global Governance and European Identity 
 









 The peaceful and democratic integration of the European countries, including 
the Eastern enlargement of the Union, cannot be completed if the EU does not be-
come a true, though not federal, polity. Making the European institutions fully le-
gitimate and accountable requires the development of political identity in a shape 
which is different from both national and cultural identity, but is not opposite to 
them, and can accommodate diversity and change. 
 Its contets can be seen in a specific set of constitutional values and principles, 
including a model of social relations, an international standing and a peculiar and 
unprecedented system of governance. Identity-formation in the EU goes through 
several channels, but has still to generate a European public sphere, though the 
source of this difficulty does not lie in the lack of a European people or demos. 
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 What has the European Union, particularly its political identity, to do with globalisa-
tion? Two keywords – governance and new regionalism – may help explaining this link 
from the venture point of the political philosophy of international and global relations. 
 Globalisation is a fashionable if inevitable word and so is governance. In the past 
decade one of the most successful books in International Relations theory carried the 
puzzling title Governance without Government (Rosenau-Czempiel, 1992). In its origi-
nal meaning within the context of system theory governance meant a kind of cybernetic 
self-control and self-regulation of the international system in the globalised world 
(Young, 1999). That the present world is governed in an impersonal way without visible 
and formal institutions of man-made government is a fascinating hypothesis, but recent 
developments show that this hypothesis does not have the strength of an overall expla-
nation; it also retains something of a free-market fundamentalism, as if the entire world 
of social and political relations could be conceived of in terms of market-like self-regu-
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lation. Some politics is still required, and there is some room for inventing and experi-
menting with new forms of government.  
 Now, among the proposals as how to govern globalisation, we find at the one end of 
the spectrum the so-called hyperglobalisation, i.e. American imperial unilateralism in 
the supposedly surviving world of Westphalian nation-states. On the opposite end the 
supporters of cosmopolitanism such as Falk and Held (see Archibugi et al., 1998) sug-
gest the notion that democratic world-government alone can master globalisation. My 
contention is that tertium datur: that is a multilateral international order based on the 
build-up of sub-continental associations of states, as envisaged in the theory of new re-
gionalism (Telò, 2001). Associations of this kind already exist, even if they are very dif-
ferent in nature and the degree of development among themselves. The European Union 
is the most mature among them, but it is just an example, not a normative model for the 
others (just to mention the most relevant ones: Mercosur in South America, Nafta in 
North America, Asean in South East Asia). Uncertainty still exists as to whether these 
blocs are going to be just competing Super-Leviathans, interacting with each other 
along the classical patterns of the balance of power, or rather can establish more civi-
lised relationships, based on collective security as well as peaceful and legal coopera-
tion. It is only clear that, if any, the EU comes closer to this second type of regionalism, 
and this makes it worth to be dealt with while discussing how to govern globalisation. 
As the debate on the European identity is biased by a considerable degree of conceptual 
confusion about identity in general and political identity in particular, more reasoning is 
needed to explain why we focus on the European political identity. It is therefore useful 
to clarify first the meaning of “political identity” on which the following reflections are 
based (see Cerutti, 1996). 
 Political identity is a set of values and principles (which may or may not include 
comprehensive views of the world/Weltbilder, but in any case implies a shared under-
standing of history, particularly of a history as contentious as the European), through 
which we recognise ourselves as a “we”. In other words we find in the sharing of these 
values, principles and interpretations enough sense and sufficient reasons for keeping 
together and designing together the future life of the polity (recognition/Anerkennung is 
the key concept in this definition, it highlights the reflexive character of political iden-
tity as a process open to change and redefinition, the opposite of a monolith). This iden-
tity does not coincide with cultural identity (culturalist fallacy), nor does it simply result 
from what we have been in the past (historicist fallacy). Particularly in the case of new 
democratic polities, it always implies choosing elements from past history and giving 
them a new order and significance (the normative or “constitutional” moment, which is 
essential in the present stage of the European process). The symbolic character of any 
(including political) identity does not imply that it must be based on a “foundational 
myth”, although some identities are and even more identities among the national ones 
used to be, not only outside the European continent. 
 Four main question can be raised about the European identity: 
• Is the political identity of Europeans necessary? 
• Is the political identity of Europeans possible?  
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• Are Europeans going to have an identity or several identities? Or: what is the 
structure of their identity likely to be? 
• What is the normative content of such an identity, what is the project contained 
in it? 
 
 1. Is the political identity of Europeans necessary?  
 Identity must be regarded as an indispensable element of the European construction 
only if we look at it as a truly political process, or in other words if we believe that 
Europe is going to become a full-fledged polity (which is not necessarily the same as to 
be a state). This is not to argue normatively that the EU has to become a full political 
entity; what is intended is just this essential, if conditional, link: if European citizens 
wish to have a political Union, they cannot reach this goal without developing a politi-
cal identity1.  
 There are structural reasons for this assertion: political identity is a condition of 
legitimacy, without legitimacy there is no life for political institutions, because they 
cannot reckon on the citizens’ allegiance and participation. Political are those institu-
tions that discuss choices and make decisions on ultimate and encompassing issues such 
as peace and war, constitutional rules, distributive justice. In the framework of Euro-
pean multilevel governance, the political decision-making power is no longer a mere 
intergovernmental issue that relies on the legitimacy of national governments. It is in-
creasingly leaving the national capitals and moving to “Brussels”, even if length and 
ambiguity of the process have to be taken seriously (“Brussels” does not mean exclu-
sively the European Commission or Parliament, but the recently reinforced weight of 
the Council as well – a Council indeed which is not necessarily a mere clearing room 
among national self-interests, as it acts under the common constraint of reinforcing 
European institutions in order to make Europe more competitive economically and more 
influential as a regulatory power)2.  
 In other words: if the EU becomes a major decision-maker in its own capacity, it can 
claim the citizens’ allegiance and exert its authority only if they feel they have enough 
things in common as to abide by the rules set by common institutions. Allegiance and 
participation must appear to them meaningful with regard to their common symbolic 
 
1 It is wise to underline the conditional nature of these reflections on the future of Europe. At this moment 
(summer 2003) it does not seem that the power elites in the member states of the European Union are eager to 
complete the development towards a more political Union which took place between the Maastricht Treaty of 
1991 and the Laeken Declaration of 2001. The disunity regarding the war in Iraq as well as the permanence of 
veto power in foreign, defence and financial policy proposed in the draft EU-Constitution seem to postpone 
the political completion of the Union to the next generation at best. The Eastern enlargement could have a re-
tarding or hindering effect on this completion process, whose happy end is by no means guaranteed. The Con-
stitution in itself is a step of ambivalent meaning, as far as political unity and identity are concerned.  
2 We have to mention that this link of political community and legitimacy rooted in identity is significant 
only if we do not share the system theory of society and its idea that in high-rationalised societies political in-
stitutions produce their own legitimacy (Luhmann’s autopoiesis).  
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and normative sphere. In this sense they must feel like one single actor (or, philosophi-
cally, one subject). Otherwise there would be little sense (and no stability of will) for 
the Portuguese to pay taxes raised by “Brussels”, or for the French to endorse a ruling of 
the European Court of Justice, or for Belgians, Italians and Polish to risk their lives in a 
peace-enforcing operation ordered by a joint EU-military command (these are just fic-
tional examples, since so far “Brussels” has not received the authority to raise taxes or 
to order military actions). 
 While there is no room here for unfolding the whole theory of legitimacy and show-
ing the links between identity and its other elements, it is worth stressing that the issue 
we have so far dealt with is political legitimacy in general, not democratic deficit. Le-
gitimacy is a ground element of political order whatsoever, and is not at all limited to 
democracies.  
 Finally, it is almost superfluous to remember that identity is not just a pre-condition 
for political communities to be perceived as legitimate, but a consequence of institu-
tionalised communal life as well. Only when the common values and images have set-
tled in formal institutions and these have started to impact on everybody’s life, in a way 
which is effective and perceivable to everybody, the consciousness of being one group 
can fully take shape and be reproduced over the years and generations. Not unlike the 
evolution of national identity, for a new group identity to take roots in the citizens’ 
mind it first takes the decision of a political and cultural élite to establish new suprana-
tional institutions and to make them work. We can perhaps say that new institutions are 
always necessarily “premature” with regard to the effective stage of identity-building, 
For example, we should carefully watch the identity-building effects of the common 
currency, which can in the future be expected considering the symbolic impact of 
money on our life-world. 
 
 2. Is the political identity of the Europeans possible? 
 The argument that national identity is the ultimate shape of political identity because 
of its unique roots in nature and history has lost all intellectual credibility as of late 
since authors such as Benedict Anderson, Ernst Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and even An-
thony Smith have worked out the “imagined” and “constructed” character of nations – 
an illumination which already emerged in Ernest Renan’s sentence “la nation est un 
plébiscite de tous les jours” (Renan, 1882). The core of all arguments against a meta-
national or a supranational identity becoming possible is the hidden and uncritical as-
sumption that conceives of it exactly in the same terms as of national identity. What 
must be stressed is, first of all, that meta-national identity3, including the European one, 
is not going to cancel and bury national identities in the same way as the national iden-
tities used to do to local and regional ones in 19th century Europe. At this stage of our 
reasoning, if we want to find out about the possibility of an European identity to exist 
 
3 Meta-national is used instead of the more usual supranational because the EU, an unprecedented mix of 
regional, national and communitarian institutions, is not likely to develop the full supranational character of a 
classical federation, and perhaps should refrain from doing so, because it would otherwise give up its un-
precedented elements of post-modern and post-etatist polity. 
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(about its Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, as Kant would say), we must refine our notion 
of it – which we are going to do in the next section. 
 There is indeed another way to raise the possibility question, this time in a more sub-
stantive version. Granted that a meta-national identity is possible in Europe, what will 
its real dimension be? The weakening or vanishing of national identities could end up in 
something which would undermine the chance for the Union’s citizens to develop a cor-
responding identity. On the one hand, they could see the EU as a mere functional entity, 
good at regulating markets, money and borders, but indistinguishable from the West, 
primarily the US, as far as values, principles and destiny are concerned – well beyond 
the political and cultural links now existing in the North-Atlantic community. On the 
other hand, they could react to the challenges and burdens of globalisation along the 
lines of what Michael Walzer (1994) has called “new tribalism”, i.e. taking refuge in a 
closed and defiant picture of the local or ethnic community – a self-defensive reaction 
which is one of the elements behind regional movements in today’s Europe (e.g. 
Vlaams Blok, Lega Nord). These movements, if they are not altogether anti-European 
and ethno-fascist like the Lega Nord, view the Union as a kind of Fortress Europe, born 
out of regional self-interests and shielding these against globalisation and immigration 
from the South. 
 Theoretical investigations cannot be expected to release prophecies about the kind of 
identity that may prevail. We can only say that the outcome is not pre-determined by 
“objective” (cultural or economic) factors, but will rather depend upon the ability of 
European citizens and statesmen to govern the Union as an autonomous and self-confi-
dent actor in the worldwide competition and cooperation. Tribalism is more likely to 
come up where untamed globalisation, lack of vision and poor governance prevail. 
Relevant to this outcome will therefore be not only the structure, but also the content of 
identity4 . 
 
3. Are Europeans going to have an identity or several identities? 
Or what is the structure of their identity likely to be? 
 The word identity is still suspicious to many, particularly to Foucaultian post-
modernists or to orthodox readers of Adorno’s Negative Dialektik. Prophets of differ-
ence, diversity, multiplicity, cannot conceive of identity other than in terms of imposed 
unity, compulsory homogeneity and totalitarian hierarchy. This amounts to all too easily 
surrendering an indispensable and neutral category like identity to ideological traditions 
such as the union sacrée, or even Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Fuehrer, or similar ethnocen-
tric types of “authoritarian personality” studied by Adorno et alii. There is more dialec-
tics between identity and difference than these prophets may ever presume. Difference 
is difference only in the relationship of different individuals or groups which share a 
common ground. This should be taken into consideration also by those who make use of 
the concept of identity, but only as a multiple, steadily renegotiated identity, and forget 
 
4 On European identity and the related theoretical problems see my contributions in Cerutti/ Rudolph 
(2001). 
 
Cerutti, F., Global Governance ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXIX, (2002), No. 5, pp. 107–115 112 
                                                                                                                                              
to say how the various identities keep together, i.e. where their moment of unity and 
permanence is to be found. But let us now focus on the specific features of political 
identity, and the European identity in particular. 
 Because of the diversity which is Europe’s indestructible richness, because of the 
gradual, piecemeal method of a process which is a process of integration rather than 
unification, because of the size of the emerging polity, the institutional structure of the 
Union is likely to be far from the centralised model of the modern state, even in the fed-
eral version. And such will be the identity of its citizens. Decision-making will remain 
located at several levels (local, regional, national, European), interconnected by bar-
gaining and competition rather than by a vertical chain of command. Once this structure 
has become clear to more and more citizens, coalitions of interests as well as old and 
new cultural affinities will link citizens and groups across national borders – to an ex-
tent, e.g. in academic cooperation, they already do so.  
 All this is still not enough to give Europeans a political identity. This can succeed 
only when people see that the Union is able to make and enforce decisions in a few es-
sential fields, in which nation-states have lost much of their independent power: how to 
ensure peace, where and why to use military force, how to ensure an elementary degree 
of economic prosperity and social stability and solidarity, a peculiar European value. 
Legitimacy is granted to institutions not just because they embody our values, they must 
also prove their effectiveness in implementing those values (by the way, this is why a 
purely normative theory of legitimacy can hardly be regarded as political theory). A 
new supranational identity can gather momentum only if people feel that some decisions 
affecting their lives are now made in “Brussels”, and that they are made by leaders who 
represent the citizens in a democratic, accountable way. Neither further elaborations on 
Europe as a “community of destiny” (Edgar Morin), nor on its Christian or Carolingian 
heritage, nor the best ever models of European constitution, not even a (desirable) huge 
increase in Erasmus exchanges or industrial joint ventures will have on the citizens a 
comparable identity-building effect. The rhetoric of the hoped-for European civil soci-
ety, which is obviously a central factor of integration and democratic control, should not 
conceal the fact that nothing is as effective in fostering political identity as political 
processes, not even an expanding European civil society. To be subject to the same 
rules, to be promoters (as electors) and addressees (as citizens of a no-longer volun-
taristic community) of the same policies: this is the circumstance which will make us 
(perhaps even the British) feel like a “we” (as far as in present-day democracies, with all 
their “unkept promises” analysed by Bobbio, citizens can still feel like a self-governed 
“we” – but this cannot be discussed here). 
 Other than social or cultural identity, political identity has and must have a centred 
structure, must be an identity and cannot be a complex of identities. If we act as a whole 
and make decisions on fundamental, even vital, issues, we cannot do that without 
thinking that it makes sense to make those decisions together and for the same reasons; 
reasons which in a democracy are not “given” or imposed, but rather defined in the 
public dialogue. Politics is also bargaining, but it is not just bargaining; nor would we 
be able to share and to legitimate those decisions if we had to think that they are the 
neutralised outcome of technical choice or strategic calculation among bearers of self-
interests. 
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 This general thesis has three corollaries in Europe. 
 It is important to keep political identity, which is just one of the several types of 
identity among which the individuals define and redefine their own personal identity, 
distinct from social and cultural identities, which have an increasingly less centred 
structure and can thus counterbalance political identity and nourish its process of 
change/adaptation. It is likewise important to understand that if we feel like Europeans 
with regard to certain general issues, we can and actually do still feel like Italians and 
Sicilians, or Germans and Bavarians, when it comes to political issues which remain in 
the power range of national and regional governments. This is a well-known fact in fed-
eral states, and there is no good reason why it should not be so in the EU, which in the 
foreseeable future will not become the United States of Europe5. 
 It is important to note that the reasons so far advanced for developing a European 
political identity do not include division from or opposition to other states or civilisa-
tions. Self-identification obviously means the perception of being different from others. 
But division or separation are not the first and sufficient basis on which to define and 
build up the new identity. Metaphorically, political identity as such is not just the rais-
ing of a boundary wall, although this is an indispensable moment and although there are 
actually identities (e.g. ethnic) which are centred on this wall. Identity-building in the 
political group is first of all the work of looking at ourselves in the mirror and finding 
enough common ideas and emotions as to justify communal life in the polis 6. 
 The narrow definition of political identity as something different from social and 
cultural identity makes the scepticism about the “rootlessness” of a European identity 
less credible. Politics is no longer the paramount human activity it used to be in republi-
can or nationalist paradigms, and it does not pretend to impose its mark on other 
spheres. Besides, it has become more “abstract” in at least two senses. First, the govern-
ance of complexity (the more in a polity of 370 and soon 450 millions) requires a high 
degree of flexibility and accomodation and does not allow for simplified principles that 
may be described and advertised in terms of substantive goals. Secondly, the policy of 
social, racial, gender and other fairness, which is the basic principle in advanced democ-
racies, lets us feel that we agree on general and procedural norms (the “rights”) rather 
than substantive policies, which are to be determined case by case in the ups and downs 
of the political game. It is the essential, constitutional agreement that is at the core of 
our “post-conventional” identity. It must also be said that the abstractness (absit iniuria 
verbo) of meta-national and post-conventional identity does not rule out symbols – like 
all communication, political communication works with symbols. It simply requires 
more abstract, less traditional types of symbols (ideas rather than flags): the European 
banner or even Beethoven’s and Schiller’s Hymne an die Freude, Europe’s not yet offi-
cial anthem, will never raise the same wave of emotions like Tricolore and Marseillaise, 
 
5 The European Union is at best defined by the interplay of political identity and cultural diversity. This is 
why the Preamble to the European Constitution, in which in a fairly illiberal way a political body strives to as-
semble pieces of our cultural diversity into one identity, is such a needless and ill-conceived enterprise. 
6 Against Huntington’s view of cultural identities as defined primarily by opposition and clash see Cerutti 
2001. 
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and the search for Europe’s symbols that may have the same character like the national 
ones is at the same time misguided and pathetic. 
 A more serious consideration deserves the argument that any post-national polity 
must lack the communality of language and habits that are common to nations and has 
insofar no concrete roots in the communicative experience of everyday life. This is true, 
although it must be remembered that a full communality is not given in all of the “his-
toric” nations. “Abstract” though it may be, the European identity will have to come to 
terms with this circumstance, and the way has still to be invented. This problem over-
laps with the problem of what public sphere and public opinion may mean in the EU, if 
this is to mean something more than the sum of national public spheres. But this is a 
problem, not an unsurpassable obstacle. 
 
 4. What is the normative content of the European political identity? 
 The abstractness of our political identity means an abstract content, not a lack of any 
content. Now, human rights (including social rights), instead of power politics, and co-
operation/integration , instead of contending sovereignties, have since 1945 been the ba-
sis on which Europeans have succeeded in redirecting their history towards the new 
common goals of peace and prosperity. This still constitutes the “project Europe”: it 
may have lost some utopian splendor of the origins, but the utopia of the Forties and 
Fifties has now become every-day reality. In so far, European unity has already roots in 
a five-decade history. 
 On the other hand, Europe is also bound to become a regional Great Power in eco-
nomic and perhaps even political terms. We do not yet know what exactly its place will 
be in the multipolar order of regional powers, but this place is now certain. The EU will 
have at the same time the chance to be a peaceful and democratic “beacon” which will 
be cheered around the globe much more than the US, and a powerful competitor in the 
planetary globalisation game. 
 How can the universalistic claims of the project be reconciled with the (necessarily) 
particularistic features of a geopolitical entity? Can they be reconciled? How will we 
feel (we, the citizens at the top of the beacon) whenever a ship with illegal immigrants 
is stopped at the Italian or Spanish shores, or – say – a decision made by the ECB or the 
Commission will have negative effects on the developing countries’ economies? 
 This is not a contradiction that can be solved once for all. Rather it is a contradiction 
which we are bound to live with, and have to learn to live with. The self-definition of 
the Europeans must take place in the field defined by the tension between those two 
poles. The democratic tradition in the United States has always had this problem, and 
we should try to come to grips with it in a less hypocritical way than on the other side of 
the Atlantic, but this should not be impossible. For example, a way to reconcile univer-
salistic claims and particularistic interests is to improve international cooperation and 
the institutionalisation of international relations – something from which the US is hin-
dered by that peculiar version of political realism (the “national interest”) that ends up 
in isolationism and/or imperial postures. There is no element in today’s political con-
science of Europeans that may force us to follow the same pattern.  
 
Cerutti, F., Global Governance ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXIX, (2002), No. 5, pp. 107–115 115 
                                                                                                                                              
 References 
Archibugi, Daniele/ Held, David/ Koehler, Martin (eds.), 1998: Re-imagining Political Commu-
nity, Polity Press, Cambridge 
Cerutti, Furio, 1996: Identità e politica, in: Cerutti, Furio (ed.), Identità e politica, Laterza, Roma-
Bari  
(cf. also German version: Identität und Politik, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 1997, 
2:175-201) 
Cerutti, Furio/ Rudolph, Enno (eds.), 2001: A Soul for Europe. On the Political and Cultural 
Identity of the Europeans, vol.1, A Reader; vol. 2, An Essay Collection, Peeters, Leuven and 
Sterling 
Cerutti, Furio, 2001: Political Identity and Conflict: a Comparison of Definitions, in: Cerutti, Fu-
rio/ Ragionieri, Rodolfo (eds.), Identities and Conflicts. The Mediteranean, Palgrave, Basing-
stoke and New York 
Morin, Edgar, 1988: Penser l’Europe, Gallimard, Paris 
Renan, Ernest, 1882: Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, Calman Lévy, Paris 
Rosenau, James/ Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds.), 1992: Governance without Government, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
Telò, Mario, 2001: Introduction: Globalization, New Regionalism and the Role of the European 
Union, and Reconsiderations: Three Scenarios, in: Telò, Mario (ed.), European Union and 
New Regionalism, Ashgate, Aldershot 
Young, Oran, 1999: Governance in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca  
Walzer, Michael, 1994: Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad, Notre Dame 
University Press, Notre Dame 
